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Abstract. In recent years, a trend in AI research has 
started to pursue human-level, general artificial intel-
ligence (AGI). Although the AGI framework is char-
acterized by different viewpoints on what intelli-
gence is and how to implement it in artificial sys-
tems, it conceptualizes intelligence as flexible, gen-
eral-purposed, and capable of self-adapting to differ-
ent contexts and tasks. Two questions remain open: 
a) should AGI projects simulate the biological, neu-
ral, and cognitive mechanisms realising the human 
intelligent behaviour? and b) what is the relationship, 
if any, between the concept of general intelligence 
adopted by AGI and that adopted by psychometri-
cians, i.e., the g factor? In this paper, we address 
these questions and invite researchers in AI to open a 
discussion on the theoretical conceptions and practi-
cal purposes of the AGI approach. 1 2 
1. INTRODUCTION: THE AGI 
HYPOTHESIS 
The dream of the first generation of AI research-
ers was to build a computer system capable of 
displaying a human-like intelligent behaviour in 
a wide range of domains. Since human intelli-
gence is highly flexible with respect to different 
tasks, goals, and contexts, making the dream 
come true would have required developing a 
general-purpose thinking machine. 
In spite of some initial success (e.g., Newell 
and Simon’s General Problem Solver [1]), the 
attempts of researchers did not result in a do-
main-general AI. What they achieved was, ra-
ther, the development of highly specialised arti-
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ficial systems that behave intelligently in narrow 
domains, namely, “narrow AI”. These kinds of 
artificial systems can carry out domain-specific 
intelligent behaviours in specific contexts and 
are, thus, unable to self-adapt to changes in the 
context as general-intelligent systems can do [2-
4]. 
The realisation of a human-level artificial 
intelligence has seemed unfeasible to many 
scholars until recent years. However, in the last 
two decades, the AI community has started to 
pursue the goal of a human-level artificial gen-
eral intelligence (AGI). This is attested by sev-
eral conferences, publications, and projects on 
human-level intelligence and related topics [4-
5]. Although these projects point to many differ-
ent directions to be followed by AGI research, 
they represent a new movement towards the 
concrete realisation of the original dream of a 
“strong AI”. 
Two important movements intertwined with 
AGI emphasize the importance of the simulation 
of the human mind. The first, known as Biologi-
cally Inspired Cognitive Architectures (BICA), 
aims to integrate many research efforts involved 
in creating a computational equivalent of the 
human mind. The second, which has been ini-
tially proposed during the First Annual Confer-
ence on Advances in Cognitive Systems (Palo 
Alto, 2012), aims to achieve the goals of the 
original AI and cognitive science, that is, ex-
plaining the mind in computational terms and 
reproducing the entire range of human cognitive 
abilities in computational artefacts [3]. 
As we mentioned, the AGI community un-
derstands general intelligence as the ability, dis-
played by humans, to solve a variety of cogni-
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tive problems in different contexts. Thus, nearly 
all AGI researchers converge on treating intelli-
gence as a whole: indeed, intelligence appears as 
a total system of which one cannot conceive one 
part without bringing in all of it [5-6]. Ben 
Goertzel [4] delineates the core AGI hypothesis 
as following: the creation and study of a synthet-
ic intelligence with sufficiently broad scope and 
strong generalization capability is qualitatively 
different from the creation and study of a syn-
thetic intelligence with significantly narrower 
scopes and weaker generalization capability. 
What is general intelligence? How can it be 
implemented in artificial systems? In order to 
address these questions, it is necessary to open a 
discussion on both theoretical and practical is-
sues in AGI research. 
In this paper, we aim to clarify what rela-
tionship exists, if any, between the concept of 
human general intelligence and the AGI hypoth-
esis. General intelligence was first conceptual-
ised in the early twentieth century within psy-
chometric research. Remarkably, as we shall 
show, psychometrics is quite a different kind of 
psychological science than the one traditionally 
tied to AI, that is, cognitive science. We shall 
argue that AGI researchers cannot safely rely on 
the psychometric concept of general intelligence 
and should, rather, look at intelligence as emerg-
ing from several distinct biological and cogni-
tive processes. 
In Section 2, we analyse different view-
points on whether AGI research should emulate 
or simulate human intelligence. Since many AGI 
projects are inspired by psychological, neurosci-
entific, and biological data about human intelli-
gence, scholars in AI should care about the psy-
chometric theory of general intelligence, its 
promises and perils. In Sections 3 and 4, we 
summarise the fundamental aspects of such a 
theory by emphasising the widespread disa-
greement about the existence of general intelli-
gence. In Section 5, we outline important impli-
cations for contemporary research on Artificial 
General Intelligence. 
2. EMULATING OR SIMULATING 
GENERAL INTELLIGENCE? 
Human intelligence is defined by psychometri-
cians as a domain-general cognitive ability, 
namely, the g factor (see Section 3 for further 
details). Wang and Goertzel [5] have rapidly 
dismissed any connection between AGI research 
and the psychometric concept of general intelli-
gence. According to them, projects in AI are not 
interested in the psychological description of 
human intelligence, if not in a weak sense. 
However, this conclusion seems to be, at 
best, premature. Indeed, some attempts in AGI 
research have encompassed a notion of intelli-
gence that should be evaluated through the 
lenses of empirical findings. Since general intel-
ligence represents to many psychologists, neuro-
scientists, and geneticists the most important and 
well-studied aspect of human psychology [7, 8], 
we cannot see any strong argument against the 
possible role of the g factor in (at least some) 
research in AGI. Let us see why. 
An AGI project can aim to either emulate or 
simulate human intelligence. In the case of emu-
lation, an artificial system will display a human-
like intelligent behaviour regardless of details 
about its realisation or implementation.3 In the 
case of simulation, instead, an artificial system 
will display general intelligence not only at the 
behavioural level but also at the mechanistic and 
processing level. In other words, human-level 
artificial intelligence is realized by underlying 
mechanisms which are analogue to those realis-
ing human intelligence. The former case likely 
represents the notion of AGI that Wang and 
Goertzel [5] have in mind. Our targets are, in-
stead, examples of AGI research characterised 
by the latter approach. 
Before analysing this approach in more de-
tails, it is worth considering that whether AGI 
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projects should emulate or simulate human intel-
ligence, and the relationship between BICA and 
AGI, are controversial topics. Franklin and col-
leagues [3, 10] agree that an AGI agent may be 
successfully developed by using an architecture 
that is not biologically inspired. However, they 
argue, the goals of AGI and BICA are essential-
ly equivalent. Indeed, AGI hopes to solve the 
problem already solved by biological cognition, 
namely, to generate adaptive behaviour on the 
basis of sensory input. Since biological minds 
represent the sole examples of the sort of robust, 
flexible, systems-level control architectures 
needed to achieve human-level intelligence, 
copying after these biological examples—as 
BICA projects do—represents a valuable strate-
gy.4 
Wang [11] disagrees with this point of 
view. According to him, in a broad sense, all AI 
projects take the human mind as the source of 
inspiration. Nonetheless, few AI researchers 
have proposed to duplicate a human cognitive 
feature without providing a reason why this is 
needed—consider that computers and human 
beings are different from each other in many 
fundamental aspects. Therefore, the important 
decision for an AGI project is where to be simi-
lar to the human mind and why this similarity is 
desired. 
Our aim is not to take a side in this contro-
versy, but rather to show that some AGI projects 
are, in fact, inspired by empirical data on human 
intelligence. Hassabis and colleagues’ review 
[12] provides several examples of how neuro-
science has inspired both algorithms and artifi-
cial architectures. Moreover, neuroscience 
seems to be able to provide validation of already 
existing AI techniques as well: if a known algo-
rithm is found to be implemented in the brain, 
then this is strong support for its plausibility as 
an integral component of an intelligent system. 
In this view, brain studies have helped develop-
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ing AI architectures by enlightening the func-
tioning of central aspects of intelligence such as 
learning, attention, and memory. 
A dialogue between neuroscience and AI 
research seems to be largely welcomed within 
the AGI community. A survey conducted by 
Muller and Bostrom [13] highlights how, ac-
cording to many researchers, a human-level AI 
will likely be achieved by means of research ap-
proaches tying AI to neuroscience—e.g., Inte-
grated Cognitive Architectures, Computational 
Neuroscience, and Whole Brain Emulation. Of 
course, the commitment to the simulation of 
psychological, cognitive, and biological aspects 
of human intelligence is exerted in many ways. 
Let us see some examples. 
Some projects belonging to BICA and 
AGI’s agendas (e.g., SyNAPSE, HTM, SAL, 
ACT-R, ICARUS, LIDA, the ANNs, the Human 
Brain Project, and the Large-Scale Brain Simu-
lator) are interested in various aspects of the 
human general intelligence and accept, though 
to different degree, that simulating the human 
brain’s structure can be promising for AI re-
search [3, 14-20]. 
Further, various researchers are inspired by 
the ontogenetic and phylogenetic aspects of hu-
man intelligence and suggest that we should 
simulate the same facilities for learning that hu-
man infants have or the evolutionary trajectory 
of intelligence [9, 21, 22]. 
Lastly, Wang [6] suggests that an AGI sys-
tem may require a single mechanism capable of 
reproducing the general-purpose, flexibility, and 
integration of human intelligence. Accordingly, 
a general intelligent system should comprise 
both domain-specific and domain-general sub-
systems: while the existing domain-specific AI 
techniques are considered tools for solving spe-
cific problems, the integrating component is 
general, flexible, and can run the various do-
main-specific programs. In the proposed archi-
tecture, i.e., the NARS, reasoning, learning, and 
categorisation represent different aspects of the 
same processes. This approach, highlighting the 
relationship between general intelligence and a 
D. Serpico & M. Frixione, 2018 
4 
 
hypothetic domain-general mechanism, is par-
ticularly interesting to us. Indeed, as we shall 
explain shortly, the psychometric theory of hu-
man intelligence draws on similar intuitions. 
Is human intelligence related to a single, 
general cognitive mechanism? How can general 
intelligence emerge from the complexity of the 
human brain? To the extent that AGI researchers 
aim to reproduce human intelligence on a mech-
anistic and processing level, they should care 
about these questions, which are typically ad-
dressed by empirical research on human intelli-
gence. In the next two sections, we briefly re-
view the psychometric theory of general intelli-
gence and ask whether AGI and BICA projects 
can safely rely on it. 
3. THE THEORY OF HUMAN 
GENERAL INTELLIGENCE 
The concept of general intelligence was born in 
the early twentieth century, in parallel with the 
rise of the psychometric tradition. The central 
aim of psychometricians is to develop method-
ologies capable of assessing and quantifying in-
tellectual differences among people, i.e., IQ 
tests. Over the last century, these tests served a 
variety of purposes, ranging from educational to 
clinical ones, but they played a central role in 
empirical research as well (e.g., in behavioural 
genetics and neuroscience).  
The concept of intelligence is generally re-
lated to a wide range of psychological aspects 
and adaptive capabilities (e.g., learning, 
knowledge, social skills, and creativity; see 
[23]). By contrast, psychometricians have main-
ly focused on the cognitive abilities mostly in-
volved in the solutions of the problems included 
in IQ tests (e.g., mathematical, linguistic, logic, 
and visual-spatial abilities). Thus, general intel-
ligence represents a theoretical construct related 
to these cognitive domains. 
In order to clarify the nature of general in-
telligence, psychometricians generally refer to 
what Charles Spearman [24] called the general 
factor of intelligence or g factor. Remarkably, 
there are two different ways of understanding g: 
on the one hand, the psychometric g; on the oth-
er hand, the neurocognitive g. Let us see them 
one by one. 
From a psychometric point of view, the g 
factor is related to the so-called positive mani-
fold: individuals who show good performance 
on a given task will tend to show good perfor-
mance also in other tasks. In other words, intel-
ligence measurements are positively intercorre-
lated both in different cognitive domains and 
different individuals. Spearman understood that 
scores of a battery of tests tend to load on one 
major factor regardless of their domain. He em-
ployed factor analysis to identify this factor. The 
g factor, as Spearman called it, is a latent varia-
ble which summarises the typical correlation 
matrix of intelligence test scores. 
What is the meaning of the psychometric g? 
Factor analysis can be understood as a procedure 
of “distillation” capable of identifying a factor 
reflecting the variance that different intellectual 
measures have in common. In this sense, the g 
factor explains ~40 percent of tests’ variance. 
Thus, it reflects individual differences in 
performance in intellectual tasks [7, 25]. This 
interpretation of g can hardly find room in 
neuroscientific research: indeed, the 
psychometric g does not represent a concrete 
neurocognitive mechanism in the strict sense, 
but rather an abstract entity or a property of a 
population of individuals (see [26] for similar 
concerns]. 
From a neurocognitive point of view, the 
story is different. In neuroscience, the g factor is 
understood as a domain-general cognitive ability 
that characterises human beings [27]. In this re-
spect, it represents the fundamental mechanism 
underlying general intelligence. However, the 
meaning of the neurocognitive g is still unclear. 
When Spearman tried to clarify the nature of 
intelligence, he described g as a form of mental 
energy. Successive researchers have tried to re-
duce g to some neurocognitive properties of the 
human brain, e.g., working memory, processing 
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speed, and neural efficiency (see Section 4 for 
details). 
The reliability of the psychometric g is gen-
erally accepted as the positive manifold repre-
sents a stable empirical phenomenon. By con-
trast, several concerns have been raised on the 
neurocognitive interpretation of g. In recent dec-
ades, many neuroscientists have come to repre-
sent the central detractors of the concept of gen-
eral intelligence. Most of them have developed 
non-generalist conceptions of human intelli-
gence; others have interpreted g as a mere statis-
tical artefact. In the next section, we analyse the 
controversial role of the general factor of intelli-
gence in neuroscientific research. 
4. A NEUROSCIENTIFIC VIEW ON 
THE g FACTOR  
Is there any evidence of the existence of g in the 
human brain? Is human intelligence general or 
not? Since psychometrics and cognitive science 
met a few decades ago, these questions divide 
scholars for both empirical and theoretical rea-
sons. 
From an empirical point of view, the pro-g 
scholars have tried to reduce g to neurocognitive 
constructs, often assumed as reliable and, hence, 
suitable to make sense of g in neuroscientific 
terms. Associations have been found, for in-
stance, between IQ and processing speed, work-
ing memory, problem-solving, meta-cognition, 
attention, associative learning, glucose metabol-
ic rates, electrocortical activity, and brain size 
[28-30]. However, to find reliable associations 
between g and these variables has not been easy 
at all: replicability rates are often low and spuri-
ous correlations ubiquitous. Moreover, the asso-
ciations between g and other aspects of the hu-
man brain are often considered to be theoretical-
ly inconsistent or, at best, weak [31, 32]. 
From a theoretical point of view, the pro-g 
scholars have developed theories of intelligence 
aimed at reconciling neuroscientific and psy-
chometric approaches. For instance, the Minimal 
Cognitive Architecture Theory [33] aims to 
match the psychometric view with developmen-
tal theories of intelligence and with the modular 
theory of mind. The Parieto-Frontal Integration 
Theory [30, 34], in turn, aims to locate the g fac-
tor into the human brain, i.e., in the parietal and 
frontal regions. 
Although these models represent interesting 
attempts, many scholars believe there is no room 
for general intelligence in contemporary neuro-
science. Indeed, most contemporary theories of 
intelligence do not include the g factor within 
the human cognitive architecture and do not 
identify a single general mechanism capable of 
summarising individual performances as a glob-
al test-score such as IQ. Rather, several aspects 
of biology and cognition are invoked. Renowned 
examples are the theory of Multiple Intelligenc-
es [35], the PASS model [36], and the Multiple 
Cognitive Mechanisms approach [37]. All these 
theories appeal to the role of several distinct 
cognitive processes to explain the human intelli-
gent behaviour. 
If there is no a general mechanism such as g 
in the human brain, why then the positive mani-
fold? Some scholars have recently provided val-
uable explanations of the empirical correlations 
among IQ-tests performance without invoking a 
general underlying mechanism. According to 
these proposals, the psychometric g is supported 
by multiple, interacting mechanisms that be-
come associated with each other throughout the 
course of development. For instance, the mutu-
alist model, proposed by Van der Maas and col-
leagues [37], recognises that the positive mani-
fold is a robust empirical phenomenon, but ad-
vances an explanation based on a developmental 
model involving the relationships between cog-
nitive processes. The mutual influence between 
these processes gives rise to the positive mani-
fold but rules out g as a single, latent variable. 
According to the architects of this model, there 
is nothing wrong with using the g factor as a 
summary index as long as we do not assume that 
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this variable relates to a single underlying pro-
cess.5 
To summarise, cognitive neuroscientists of-
ten deny the existence of the neurocognitive g 
and, thus, suggest that general intelligence does 
not represent a valuable posit for understanding 
human cognition (see also [38]). The disagree-
ment about the existence of the g factor can be 
clarified by considering the theoretical gap be-
tween psychometrics and cognitive science. 
Since the birth of cognitive psychology, cogni-
tive scientists have focused on the functional-
structural segmentation of the human mind. 
Thus, in a neurocognitive perspective, mental 
abilities and cognitive processes cannot be con-
sidered properties of the brain taken as a whole: 
rather, they are implemented by specific brain-
areas and populations of neurons (for instance, 
the modularity of mind hypothesis relies on this 
assumption). This conclusion is sometimes 
agreed by researchers in AGI as well. For in-
stance, Goertzel [4] has contrasted the concep-
tion of general intelligence with approaches 
looking at the various competencies humans 
display (see the list of competences assembled at 
the 2009 AGI Roadmap Workshop [2]). 
In the last section, we explore some impli-
cations for research in AI. 
5. CONCLUSIONS: IMPLICATIONS 
FOR AI RESEARCH 
The quest for the nature of human intelligence, 
involving its generality and its architecture, re-
mains open. However, it stands to reason that 
general intelligence cannot be safely understood 
as a real biological entity. Rather, we can de-
scribe it as a behavioural, emergent phenomenon 
due to the causal interaction between many as-
pects of the neurocognitive development. Ac-
cordingly, intelligence seems to be a term im-
ported by everyday life that clusters together 
distinct cognitive processes, autonomous to a 
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certain extent both in developmental and evolu-
tionary terms. 
What does this imply for AI researchers 
who adopt a generalist view of intelligence? 
Two things, at least. First, the generalist concep-
tion of intelligence, if adopted in AGI and BI-
CA, threatens to inherit the weaknesses of its 
relative in the human domain, the psychometric 
one. Artificial systems inspired by such a theory 
can well turn out to be less human-oriented than 
other, classical ones, such as the so-called nar-
row AI systems. Second, implementing some 
sort of general-purpose mechanism in artificial 
systems to emulate the human intelligent behav-
iour—as Wang [6], among others, suggests—
may not be the right strategy. 
It is worth noting that, in general, a psy-
chometric-like view of intelligence does not 
play a central role in AI. Indeed, most contem-
porary artificial architectures do not assume that 
a human-level intelligence necessarily requires a 
single generative mechanism. Rather, intelli-
gence is understood as emerging from many un-
derlying aspects—an interpretation with which, 
as we have shown, many cognitive neuroscien-
tists agree. At the same time, almost any scholar 
would agree that the classical narrow approach 
to AI is unsuccessful in shifting towards a hu-
man-level intelligence. 
So, what there is between specialised artifi-
cial systems and a single domain-general mech-
anism? Is there any intermediate level to work 
on? Essentially, these are the questions AGI re-
searchers aim to address (see [14, 39]). In other 
words, AGI researchers are asked to develop 
lower-level, specific-purposed systems capable 
of generating higher-level networks of processes 
and interactions. These networks would argua-
bly realise general intelligence on the behav-
ioural level. Indeed, intelligence represents a 
systemic and dynamical property of complex 
systems. 
Unfortunately, even complex cognitive ar-
chitectures, such as SOAR and ACT-R, are 
characterised by both technical and epistemolog-
ical problems (see e.g., [14, 40, 41]). Neurosci-
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entific theories of intelligence can help AI by 
providing a meaningful explanation of human 
neurocognitive development. Nevertheless, tak-
ing up the challenge ultimately depends on the 
ability of AI researchers to pick up the relevant 
conceptions of what an intelligent system is. In 
this sense, a discussion on general intelligence 
in AI seems to us, at present, inevitable. 
Can the g factor play a role in AGI research, 
after all? In light of our discussion, the answer 
can be either positive or negative. Roughly, the 
answer depends on what the aims of AGI are. A 
weak or instrumental notion of g, like the psy-
chometric g, can play a role in AGI projects 
characterised by an emulative approach, where 
the goal is reproducing a human-level intelli-
gence regardless of details about its neurocogni-
tive or biological architecture. Here, the psy-
chometric g, as assessed by IQ tests, might help 
to evaluate the intelligent behaviour of artificial 
systems besides other behavioural tests—e.g., 
Turing and Nilsson’s tests. 
By contrast, a strong, neurocognitive notion 
of g is involved in the discussion about the com-
position of human intelligent systems, the causal 
interactions among parts, and how to artificially 
reproduce these aspects. In this respect, the pos-
sible role of the g factor in AGI research de-
pends on empirical data in neuroscience. As we 
have argued in this paper, this role of g in AI is 
dubious. 
As we noticed, AGI research encompasses 
different viewpoints on what intelligence is and 
on what the purposes of a human-level AI are. 
While many authors in AGI are cautious about 
their assumptions, others believe it is not enough 
to merely emulate the intelligent behaviour. Ra-
ther, in this view, artificial systems should simu-
late the mechanisms and processes that make 
humans intelligent the way they are. For these 
approaches, where theories and data adopted by 
cognitive neuroscientists play an important role, 
we invite cautious about the commitment to the 
concept of general intelligence. As Goertzel [4] 
notices, brain sciences are advancing rapidly, 
but our knowledge about the brain is extremely 
incomplete. Seemingly, relying on a controver-
sial theory of human intelligence, such as the 
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